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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a legal malpractice case. Appellants, Walter C. Minnick and A.K. Lienhart Minnick 
(collectively, the "Minnicks"), sued Respondents, the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley 
("HTEH") and HTEH attorney Geoffrey Wardle ("Wardle"), regarding the legal services 
Respondents provided in the context of a real estate transaction. Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial, ~ 15 (R. pp. 000008-9). Part of this transaction included a conservation easement that was 
recorded on September 7, 2006. Jd. at ~ 29. (R. p. 000011). 
It is undisputed that the Respondents did not review the conservation easement to ensme that 
it complied with the requirements necessary to constitute a charitable donation under the Internal 
Revenue Code and applicable regulations. Nevertheless, the Minnicks claimed the conservation 
easement was a tax-deductible charitable donation worth $941,000 on their 2006,2007, and 2008 
tax returns. Jd. at ~~ 35-37. (R. p. 000012-13). On July 8, 2009, the Internal Revenue Service 
("I.R.S.") notified the Minnicks that the deductions were disallowed for failme to comply with the 
Internal Revenue Code and applicable regulations governing the tax deductibility of conservation 
easements as charitable donations. Jd. at ~ 38. (R. p. 000013). 
In the Complaint, the Minnicks claim that it was negligent for the Respondents not to review 
the conservation easement to ensme that it would meet the requirements necessary to constitute a 
tax-deductible donation for income tax purposes, "including but not limited" to the requirements 
identified in 26 C.P.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(2) and (g)(6). Jd. at~~53-56 (emphasis added). (R. p. 000015-
16). The Milmicks further allege that this alleged negligence proximately caused them to: (l) lose 
the tax benefits that would have been associated with the conservation easement; (2) incm penalties 
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and fees associated with the disallowed deductions and unpaid taxes; and (3) incur the costs 
associated with retaining legal counsel to "protect and prosecute their interests." fd. at ~~ 59-60. CR. 
p.000016-17). 
Respondents vigorously deny the Minnicks' allegations. Respondents contend it was 
reasonable for them not to review the conservation easement for tax purposes, because: 
Ca) Mr. Minnick dictated the terms of the parties' relationship and 
requested that Respondents provide only those services he 
specifically requested; 
Cb) Mr. Minnick did not tell the respondents he intended to claim the 
conservation easement was a gift for income tax purposes or 
otherwise request personal income tax advice; and 
(c) the conservation easement did not look anything like a gift, 
because it was a condition of plat approval and the Minnicks did not 
give up anything of value given applicable zoning restrictions. 
See Defendant's ll.femorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motionfor Partial Summary Judgment, 
pp. 16-20 CR. pp. 00604-608). Respondents further contend that the alleged negligent conduct has 
no impact whatsoever on the Mim1icks' inability to obtain favorable tax treatment for the 
conservation easement, because the conservation easement was not a gift; it was a condition of plat 
approval and the Minnicks did not give up anything of value given applicable zoning restrictions. 
fd. 
These disputes offact are provided for background purposes only. They speak to the merits 
ofthe Minnicks' claims and the Respondents' affirmative defenses. However, they are not material 
to the district court's decision dismissing the Minnicks' claims on statute oflimitations grounds. 
In contrast, the following facts are both undisputed and material to a decision applying the 
statute of limitations to the Minnicks' claim: 
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(1) Respondents did not review the conservation easement for tax 
purposes or otherwise provide the Minnicks with tax advice; 
(2) the Minnicks claimed the conservation easement was a 
charitable gift worth $941,000 for the purpose of an income 
tax deduction on their 2006,2007, and 2008 federal income 
tax returns; 
(3) on June 1,2009, the Minnicks hired separate tax counsel to 
help them address the I.R.S. 's concerns about the deductions; 
(4) on July 8, 2009, the I.R.S. sent the Minnicks a formal notice 
that the claimed deductions for the conservation easement 
were disallowed; and 
(5) this lawsuit was commenced on June 7, 2012 when the 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial was filed. 
See Memorandum in Support of P laint~fJ's A10tionfor Partial Summary Judgment, pp. 14-15 CR. pp. 
000283-84). 
The district court properly dismissed the Minnicks' Complaint on statute of limitations 
grounds. Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 5-219(4), an action for professional malpractice must be 
commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. The district court held, as a matter 
of law, that the cause of action accrued on: (1) June 1, 2009 when the Minnicks hired separate tax 
counsel to defend them in the Tax Court proceedings or, alternatively, (2) July 8, 2009, at the latest, 
when the Minnicks were notified that their income tax deductions were disallowed. The lawsuit was 
filed more than two years later. 
The district court properly rejected the Minnicks' argument that their cause of action did not 
accrue until June 14,2011 when they discovered for the first time that the mortgage had not been 
subordinated to the conservation easement. See also Complaint, ~~ 43-44 (R. pp. 000013-000014). 
The district court determined, based on Mr. Minnick's sworn testimony offered in the Tax Court 
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proceedings and the allegations set forth in the Complaint, that the Minnicks claim they retained the 
Defendants to handle all aspects of the conservation easement, including the tax implications. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's 1l1otion for Summary Judgment, pp. 7-9, 
(R. pp. 000725- 000727. Accordingly, the cause of action accrued as soon as the Minnicks retained 
separate tax counsel to address any tax problem associated with the conservation easement. ld. 
Once the Minnicks hired separate tax counsel, they suffered a legally cognizable harm associated 
with the negligence alleged -- that is, the Respondents' failure to provide them with personal income 
tax advice. 
The district court also properly granted the Respondents' request for fees as the prevailing 
party pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121(3). In their Complaint, the Minnicks requested 
attorneys fees pursuant to I.e. § 12-120(3) alleging that the parties' relationship was "commercial 
in nature." Complaint and Demandfor Jury Trial, ~~ 52, 60. (R.pp. 000016-17). Nevertheless, when 
faced with a similar request from the Respondents after they had prevailed on summary judgment, 
the Minnicks changed their position and argued both below, and now on appeal, that the underlying 
transaction was not commercial in nature. Because the underlying relationship involved a real estate 
development project, the district court was con-ect in characterizing the relationship as commercial 
in nature. 
The district court's decisions granting summary judgment and awarding the Respondents 
their attorneys fees should be upheld. The decisions are based on undisputed facts and controlling 
Idaho Supreme Court precedent. To ovel1urn the district court's decisions, the Idaho Supreme Court 
must reconsider and overturn its own precedents. 
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B. Procedural History 
The Minnicks' summary of the proceedings before the district court is accurate in terms of 
the dates of the various submissions. However, the procedural history neglects to identify the 
allegations and claims as framed in the pleadings and the legal basis for the district court's decisions 
on summary judgment and regarding the request for fees. These three issues are addressed below. 
1. The Allegations and Claims as Framed in the Pleadings. 
The allegations in the Complaint reflect that the Respondents were not hired solely to prepare 
the conservation easement and subordinate the mortgage. First, the conservation easement was but 
one part of a larger real estate development proj ect: 
(l) the Mimlicks hired Respondents to provide professional legal 
services "on a real estate development project known as Shovvy Phlox 
Subdivision .... " (Complaint and Demand/or Jury Trial, ~ 15); 
(2) a "feature of the proposed development project would be a 
conservation easement to be granted to the Land Trust ofthe Treasure 
Valley, Inc. ("Land Trust")." (ld. at ~ 17); and 
(3) "On September 6, 2006, Wardle presented Minnick with a large 
number of agreements, instruments and documents requiring his 
signature, including the revised and finalized Conservation Easement 
Agreement. ... " (ld. at ~ 28). 
(R. pp. 000008-10). 
Second, in the Complaint, the Minnicks allege that they hired the Respondents to assist with 
all aspects of the transaction at issue. The Minnicks allege they were: 
[R]elying and depending on the law firm to address any and all legal 
issues and concerns related to the Development Project and essential 
to achieving its objectives, including those directly related to and 
potentially affecting the conservation easement and the Plaintiffs' 
ability to obtain a charitable tax deduction for the conservation 
easement gift. 
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Id. at ~ 20. (R.pp. 000009-10). 
On January 14, 2013, the Respondents filed an Answer with a number of affirmative 
defenses. (R.pp. 19-29). These included, inter alia: (1) comparative negligence of the Minnicks; 
(2) estoppel; (3) statute of limitations; and (4) the "allegations of damages due to disallowed 
charitable deduction by the I.R.S. and U.S. Tax Court are damages Plaintiffs would have sustained 
for reasons other than a failure to subordinate liens on the subject property for reasons that have 
nothing to do with any conduct on the part of the Defendants." Answer, pp. 7-8. (R.pp. 000025-26). 
2. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. On August 8,2013, Respondents filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment solely focused on the statute oflimitations issue. (R.pp.000028-29). 
This motion was supported by an affidavit from counsel. (R. p. 000047-265). 
On August 16, 2013, the Milmicks filed a motion for summary judgment on four of the 
Defendants' affirmative defenses, including the statute oflimitations defense. (R.pp. 000266-69). 
The Respondents' motion was supported by affidavits from: (1) Ada County Development Staff 
Member Steven Malone (R. pp. 000309-314); (2) Land Trust of the Treasure Valley Executive 
Director Tim Breuer (R. pp. 000315-336); and (3) tax attorney Tim A. Tmier, the Minnicks' counsel 
in the Tax Court proceedings (R. pp. 000337-586). In opposition to the Minnicks' motion for 
summary judgment, Plaintiffs filed affidavits from: (1) counsel (R. pp. 000614-648); (2) Respondent 
Wardle (R. pp. 000649-652); and (3) HTEH attorney Brian Ballard (R. pp. 000653-657). 
The district court held a hearing on both motions on October 2,2013. (R. pp. 000045-46). 
On October 28,2013, the district judge issued a decision granting Respondents' motion for summary 
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judgment effectively dismissing the Complaint on the basis that it was untimely pursuant to Idaho 
Code Section 5-219(4). See .Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' A1otionfor 
Summary Judgment (R pp. 719-29). 
The Minnicks argued below and again on appeal that the alleged negligence was specific to 
the Respondent's failure to obtain a subordination agreement with the lender before recording the 
conservation easement. The district court rejected this argument. The district court examined the 
allegations in the Complaint at paragraphs 22 through 24 and Mr. Minnick's January 14, 2013 
affidavit submitted to the Tax Court l and determined the Minnicks retained Respondents to handle 
all matters related to the easement and charitable deduction: 
[T]he Court finds that (1) without limitation, the Plaintiffs expected 
the Defendants to structure the transaction so as to allow them to 
claim the easement as a charitable donation and (2) for the purposes 
of this motion, the scope of the Defendants' representation included 
any and all issues related to the recording of the easement and the 
related charitable deduction. 
},lemorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendants' Motionfor Summary Judgment, p. 8. (Rp. 
000726). 
Given the scope of representation, the district court concluded the Minnicks suffered some 
damage on June 1,2009 when they retained counsel to represent them in the I.RS. proceedings. Id. 
"Since ... the scope of representation encompassed all tasks related to the charitable deduction, the 
statute oflimitations began to run as soon as the Plaintiffs retained new counsel to help them resolve 
the charitable deduction dispute with the I.R.S." Id. 
1 See Affidavit of Walter C. Minnick ("Minnick AfJ."), attached as Ex. A to Exhibit T of 
the Affidavit of Tim A. Tarter ("Tarter AfJ."). (R pp. 498-503). 
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The Court also determined the Minnicks "were specifically notified" that their deduction 
would be disallowed on July 8, 2009. Id. at p. 9. CR. p. 000727). Accordingly and alternatively, the 
statute of limitations began to run no later than July 8, 2009. Id. 
3. District Court's Decision on Fees and Costs 
On November 12,2013, the Respondents filed a Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs. (R. 
pp. 000730-31). It is undisputed that Respondents, as the prevailing party, are entitled to their costs 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 54( d)(1 )(A). In addition, pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3), 
Respondents sought their attorneys fees in the amount of$ 62,760.00 on the basis that the underlying 
transaction, the real estate development project, was a commercial transaction. See Defendants' 
Verified Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, pp. 3-4 (R. pp. 000734-35). The Minnicks 
opposed the motion arguing that the transaction at issue was personal in nature. See Memorandum 
in Support of Plaintiffs 'Objection to Defendants' Motionfor an Avvard of Attorneys Fees and Costs 
and Memorandum of Fees and Costs (R. pp. 000750-63). The Minnicks also argued that the fees 
sought were umeasonable. Id. 
On December 30,2013, the district court issued a decision granting the Respondents' request 
for fees as the prevailing party but reduced the amount requested to $50,000. Memorandum Decision 
and Order on Defendant's Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs. (R. p. 00078-0-790). The district 
court determined that the transaction at issue was commercial, as reflected by the Minnicks' request 
for fees under Section 12-120(3) claimed in their Complaint. Id. at p. 8 (R. p. 000787). 
Nevertheless, the Court reduced the fee in part, because the billing records submitted in support of 
the fees request were redacted and the COUli could not fully assess how much time and labor was 
required in the case. Id. at p. 9 (R. p. 000788). 
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C. Statement of Facts2 
The Minnicks had been clients of the Respondent law firm for quite some time when, in 
February 2006, they engaged Respondents "on a real estate development project known as Shovvy 
Phlox Estates Subdivision." Complaint and Demand/or Jury Trial, ~ 15. (R. p. 000008). The 
development was comprised of seven single family, residential housing lots of approximately ten 
acres each on a 73.81 acre site. Jd. at'~ 15-16 (R. p. 000009). One of the features of the project was 
a conservation easement that was eventually granted to the Land Trust of the Treasure Valley. Jd. 
at, 17 CR. p. 000009). 
The Minnicks allege that they told Respondent Wardle that they desired and intended to 
obtain certain income tax advantages associated with the conservation easement. Jd. at' 19 (R. p. 
000009). The Minnicks further allege that they: 
were relying and depending upon the law firm to address any and all 
legal issues and concerns related to the Development Project and 
essential to achieving its objectives, including those directly related 
to and potentially affecting the conservation easement and the 
Plaintiff's ability to obtain a charitable tax deduction for the 
conservation easement gift. 
Jd. at, 20 (R. pp. 000009-10). Also according to the Minnicks, Respondent Wardle acknowledged 
"there were tax issues and related legal concerns affecting the conservation easement that needed 
to be appreciated and addressed" and "he would engage other attorneys within Hawley Troxell with 
tax law expertise to assist him on addressing and resolving these matters." Id. at ~ 24 (R. p. 000010). 
2 Because the district court's decision was based on the Respondents' motion for 
summary judgment, the "facts" are drawn from the allegations in the Minnicks' Complaint and 
affidavits. Many of these facts are disputed by the Respondents. 
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On September 6, 2006, in the context of executing a number of other documents required to 
accomplish the legal subdivision of the property, Mr. Minnick signed the conservation easement 
agreement. ld. at Ctf 28 (R. p. 000011). The next day, the conservation easement was recorded with 
the Ada County Recorder's Office. ld. 
The parties do not dispute that there are a number of requirements that must be met in order 
for a conservation easement to qualify for a tax deduction pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code and 
related regulations. The two requirements specifically identified in the Complaint are the mortgage 
subordination requirement and the proceeds requirement. ld. at ~~ 26 -27 (R. p. 000011). 
Respondents do not dispute that the conservation easement did not meet either requirement. 
In fact, Respondents concede that they did not review the conservation easement for personal income 
tax purposes and, as a result, the conservation easement did not meet a number of other 
requirements, including the basic element of "donative intent" required to constitute a charitable gift. 
See Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaint~ffs' MotionforSummaryJudgment,pp.16-20. 
(R. pp. 000604-608). 
On June 20, 2008, the Minnicks first received notice that their 2006 federal income tax return 
was selected for audit with specific focus on "Schedule A- Contributions- Conservation Easement." 
(R.pp. 338, ~ 5; 344-46). After initial efforts to resolve the dispute proved ineffective, the Minnicks 
hired a tax attorney, Tim Tarter, on June 1,2009. (R.p. 338, ~ 4). 
On July 8, 2009, the I.R.S. provided the Minnicks with two Notice of Disallowance letters, 
one for 2006, and the other for the carry-over deductions for 2007 and 2008. (R.pp. 347-58 (2006), 
pp. 359-73 (2007,2008). Included with these Notices are the Examiner Reports, which provide the 
I.R.S. Examiner's reasoning for disallowing the deduction. Affidavit of Tim A. Tarter, ~ 8. CR. p. 
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0000338). In these documents, the I.R.S. notified the Minnicks that their income tax deductions for 
the conservation easement were disallowed because "[t]he taxpayers have not demonstrated that the 
easement met the statutory requirements for a conservation contribution." (R.pp. 350,361). 
The Examiner Reports outline several reasons why the conservation easement fails to meet 
the statutory requirements for a conservation contribution, specifically including the requirement that 
the contribution be made "exclusively for conservation purposes" as outlined in Internal Revenue 
Code Section 170(h)(1)3 and Treasury Regulation Section 1.170A-14(a).4 (R.pp. 000355-356, 
000366-67) (emphasis added). The Notice further outlines that a contribution will be deemed 
"exclusively for conservation purposes" only if it is protected in perpetuity as defined under Internal 
Revenue Code Sections 170 (h)(4) and 170(h)(5). (R.pp. 356,367). 
Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h)( 4) generally describes what purposes qualify as 
conservation purposes. 26 U.S.c. § 170(h)(4). For example, the conservation contribution may 
preserve land for the general public's outdoor recreation or education; protect relatively natural 
habitats; preserve open space; or preserve historically important land or structures. ld. 
3 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1) states: 
"[T]he term 'qualified conservation contribution' means a contribution -
(A) of a qualified real property interest, 
(B) to a qualified organization, 
(C) exclusively for conservation purposes. 
426 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(a) states that a "deduction under section 170 is generally not 
allowed for a charitable contribution of any interest in property that consists of less than the 
donor's entire interest in the property." 26 CFR § 1. 170A-14(a). The regulations outlines that 
there is an exception to this rule for "qualified conservation contributions" but "[t]o be eligible 
for a deduction under his section, the conservation purpose must be protected in perpetuity." 
ld. (emphasis added). 
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Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h)(5) provides that "[a] contribution shall not be treated 
as exclusively for conservation purposes unless the conservation purpose is protected in perpetuity." 
26 U.s.C. § 170(h)(5)(A) (the "perpetuity requirement"). To satisfy the perpetuity requirement, the 
taxpayer must show: 
(1) if the property is subject to a mortgage that "the mortgagee 
subordinates its rights in the property to the right of the qualified 
organization to enforce the conservation purposes of the gift in 
perpetuity," 26 CFR § 1.170A-14(g)(2) ("mortgage subordination 
requirement") and 
(2) in case the conservation easment is extinguished, the proceeds of 
the conservation easement must inure to the benefit of the donee 
organization, 26 CFR § 1. 170A-14(g)(6) ("proceeds requirement"). 
The Examiner Reports also reflect that the Minnicks "contend that the conservation easement 
qualifies as a charitable contribution" and "the only issue that should be considered is the value 
placed on the contribution." (R.pp. 358,369). Despite the Minnicks' perspective on the issue, the 
Examiner Reports show the I.R.S. was clearly looking into many other areas, including the perpetuity 
requirements of26 U.S.c. § 170(h)(5). (R.pp. 352-58, pp. 363-69). 
On September 17, 2009, the I.R.S. issued the Minnicks a notice of deficiency seeking unpaid 
taxes and penalties for 2007 and 2008. Complaint and Demand/or Jury Trial, ~ 40 (R. p. 000013). 
In response, the Minnicks filed a petition in the United States Tax Court ("Tax Comi") on December 
14,2009, challenging the disallowance of the deductions. ld. at ~ 41. 
On June 11, 2011, in the context of the Tax Court proceedings, the I.R.S. specifically 
requested documentation related to the loan subordination issue. ld. at ~ 43. The Minnicks allege 
that this is the first time they "discovered" the mortgage subordination issue. ld. at ~ 44. 
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II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The following additional issue is presented on appeal: (1) Whether the Respondents are 
entitled to attorneys fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121(3). 
III. ARGUMENTS 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court applies the same 
standard of review that was used by the trial cOUli in ruling on the motion. Indian Springs LLC v. 
Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737,746,215 P.3d 457, 466 (2009). Pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate "ifthe pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." LR.C.P.56(c). 
B. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSERVATION EASEMENTS TO QUALIFY AS 
TAX-DEDUCTIBLE DONATIONS 
Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code provides the statutory basis for charitable 
contribution deductions: "There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution ... 
payment of which is made within the taxable year." 26 U.S.c. § 170(a). A charitable contribution 
may include a gift of property to a charitable organization provided the gift is made with charitable 
intent and without the receipt or expectation of receipt of actual consideration. See Hernandez v. 
Comm 'r, 490 U.S. 680,690 (1989); United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116-118 
(1986). 
Generally taxpayers are not allowed a deduction for a gift of property that constitutes less 
than the taxpayer's entire property interest. Esgar Corp. v. CI.R., 744 F.3d 648, 657 (lOth Cir. 
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2014); see also 26 U.S.c. § 170(£)(3) ("Denial of deduction in case of certain contributions of partial 
interests in property") (emphasis added». However, the Internal Revenue Code includes an 
exception to this rule for "qualified conservation contribution[s ]." 26 U.S.C. § 170(£)(3)(B)(iii). To 
constitute a "qualified conservation contribution," the gift at issue must be: (1) a qualified real 
property interest; (2) to a qualified organization; (3) exclusively for conservation purposes." 26 
usc. § 170(h)(1). 
The I.R.S. determined that the Milmicks' conservation easement failed to meet the 
requirements necessary to demonstrate that it was made "exclusively for conservation purposes" as 
required under 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1). (R. 000354, 365). In order to meet the "exclusively for 
conservation purposes" requirement, the contribution must satisfy the requirements of section 
170(h)(4) and (5), as well as related regulations. 
The requirements of Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h)( 4) are not at issue in these 
proceedings. However, Section 170(h)(5) provides that no contribution will "be treated as 
exclusively for a conservation purposes unless the conservation purpose is preserved in 
perpetuity." 26 U.S.c. § 170(h)(5) (emphasis added). 
The federal regulations provide further guidance regarding the perpetuity requirement 
outlined in Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h)(5). }v1itchell v. C.IR., 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 215 
(T.C. 2013), 2013 WL 4606294, *5 ("Section 1.170A-14(g), Income Tax Regs., elaborates on the 
enforceability-in-perpetuity requirement."). First, the conservation easement "must be subject to 
legally enforceable restrictions ... that will prevent uses of the retained interest inconsistent with 
the conservation purposes of the donation." 26 C.F .R. § 1 70A -14(g)( 1). This requirement recognizes 
that the conservation easement is a grant of a partial interest in the property: typically, the right to 
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develop the property. The property owner may retain all other rights to the property, including the 
right of possession and use. Accordingly, the property owner cannot exercise the property rights it 
retains in a way that would undermine or diminish the conservation values that are intended to be 
protected by the contribution. 
Second is the mortgage subordination requirement. If there is a mOligage on the propeliy, 
the mortgagor must subordinate its rights in the property to the right of the qualified organization. 
"[N]o deduction will be permitted ... for an interest in property which is subject to a mOligage 
unless the mortgagee subordinates its rights in the property to the right of the ... [donee] 
organization to enforce the conservation purposes of the gift in perpetuity." 26 C.F.R. § 170A-
14(g)(2). This is necessary in case the property owner defaults on the loan secured by the mortgage 
and the propeliy is foreclosed or otherwise comes into the possession of the mortgagee. If the 
mortgage is not subordinated to the conservation easement, then there is a risk that the property will 
revert back to the mortgagee without any of the conservation protections in place. 
Third is the proceeds requirement. See 26 C.F.R. §170A-14(g)(6). The easement must 
provide for judicial extinguishment in the event there is an unexpected change in the conditions 
surrounding the property that make it impossible or impractical to continue use of the property for 
conservation purposes. 26 C.F.R. § 170A-14(g)(6)(i). In addition, all of the donee's proceeds from 
a subsequent sale or exchange of the property must be used in a mam1er consistent with the 
conservation purposes of the original contribution." Jd. Further, 
for a deduction to be allowed under this section, at the time of the gift 
the donor must agree that the donation of the perpetual conservation 
restriction gives rise to a property right immediately vested in the 
donee organization with a fair market value that is at least equal to the 
proportionate value that the perpetual conservation restriction at the 
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time of the gift bears to the value of the property as a whole at that 
time. 
26 C.P.R. § 170A-14(g)(6)(ii). 
It is undisputed that the Respondents did not review the Minnicks' conservation easement 
to ensure it complied with these requirements. As a result, the conservation easement failed to meet 
a number of requirements necessary to constitute a charitable contribution for federal income tax 
purposes. In their Complaint, the Minnicks outline two of these deficiencies, the mortgage 
subordination and proceeds requirements, and indicate that there may be others. Complaint and 
DemandforJury Trial, ~ 56. (R. pp. 000015-16). 
C. THE TRIAL CORRECTLY DECIDED THE MINNICKS' CLAIMS ARE TIME-
BARRED PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 5-219(4). 
"An action to recover damages for 'professional malpractice' must be commenced within two 
years after the cause of action has accrued.'" Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 585,51 P.3d 396, 
399 (2002); I.c. § 5-219(4). The cause of action accrues "as of the time of the occurrence, act, or 
omission complained of." LC. § 5-219(4). 
In some professional negligence cases, the conduct comprising the negligence occurs at one 
time and the damage resulting therefrom at another. The Idaho Supreme Court has addressed this 
issue holding "a cause of action for professional negligence cam10t accrue until some damage has 
occurred." City oflv1cCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 659, 201 P.3d 629, 632 (2009) (emphasis 
added) (citing Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 254, 678 P.2d 41,46 (1984». "The reason for the 
'some damage' rule is that 'in order to recover under a theory of negligence, the plaintiff must prove 
actual damage. '" ld. Meaning, the statute of limitations begins to run once the plaintiff has a 
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cognizable claim including damage "that the client could recover from the professional in an action 
for malpractice." Id. (citing Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho 582, 586, 51 P.3d 396, 400 (2002». 
The limitations period is "not extended by reasoning of any continuing consequence or 
damages resulting therefrom or any continuing professional or commercial relationship between the 
injured party and the alleged wrongdoer." I.e. § 5-219(4). Similarly, the limitations period is not 
extended to account for actual knowledge or discovery of the harm alleged: 
This court has made very clear that whether there was some damage 
or whether that damage was objectively ascertainable, does not 
depend upon the knowledge of the injured party because such 
dependence would effectively create a discovery rule which the 
legislature has expressly rejected. 
Stuard v. Jorgenson, 150 Idaho 701, 704, 249 P.3d 1156, 1159 (2011). Meaning, it does not matter 
when the claimant "discovered" the harm caused by the negligent conduct; so long as the harm is 
"objectively ascertainable," the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run 
on the claim. 
"When there is conflicting evidence as to when the cause of action accrued, the issue is one 
for the trier offact." Id. However, "[i]fthe evidence reveals no disputed issues ofmaterial fact, then 
only a question of law remains .... " In the instant case, the facts material to the accrual 
determination are not in dispute. Rather, the Minnicks challenge the district court's interpretation 
of these undisputed facts. 
1. The Cause of Action Accrued on June 1,2009 When the Minnicks First Hired 
a Tax Attorney to Represent Them in the Tax Court Proceedings. 
Assuming arguendo: (1) the Respondents should have reviewed the conservation easement 
to ensure it complied with federal income tax requirements necessary to constitute a charitable gift 
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and (2) if they had, the conservation easement would have met the federal income tax requirements 
necessary to constitute a charitable gift, then the Minnicks' suffered some damage on June 1,2009 
when they engaged tax attorney, Tim Tarter, to address the deficiencies identified by the Internal 
Revenue Service. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically addressed the "some damage" question in the exact 
context presented here: where the alleged malpractice relates to the provision of, or failure to 
provide, tax advice that results in the I.R.S. imposing additional taxes, penalties, or interest on the 
client, and the client hires separate tax counsel to represent him in those tax proceedings. See Elliot 
v. Parsons, 128 Idaho 723, 918 P.2d 592 (1996). In Elliotv. Parsons, the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that some damage occurs to a plaintiff taxpayer at the point at which the I.R.S. "assesses" an 
enforceable and collectable tax liability or earlier if the plaintiff taxpayer retains new counsel 
to resolve the dispute with the I.R.S. Id. (emphasis added). 
The Elliot v. Parsons decision is entirely dispositive ofthis appeal. In Elliot, the plaintiffs 
owned several business entities and consulted with their attorney, Mr. Parsons, regarding a proposed 
sale of various elements of their business. Id. at 724,918 P.2d 593. According to the Elliots, the 
attorney was supposed to structure the transactions so that they could qualify for favorable tax 
treatment. Id. After the attorney drafted the documents, and the transactions were completed, the 
Elliots filed their tax returns based on the assumption that the transactions qualified for the favorable 
tax treatment. Id. The I.R.S. thereafter conducted an audit and concluded that the transaction did 
not qualify for the favorable tax treatment. Id. Accordingly, the I.R.S. issued a 30-Day notice of 
disallowance letter on February 14, 1986, regarding the taxes due in 1982. Id. The Elliots 
immediately contacted a tax lawyer to help them address the issue. Id. 
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Like the Minnicks, the Elliots filed a petition in Tax Court. Id. However, on the eve of that 
trial, the Elliots reached a settlement for the amount of unpaid taxes and then sued their former 
attorney, Mr. Parsons. Id. 
Mr. Parsons filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the Elliots suffered "some 
damage" when they received their 30-Day notice of disallowance letter. Id. at 725,918 P.2d 594. 
The district court agreed, and the Elliots appealed arguing that there cause of action could not accrue 
until a decision had been reached and a final assessment charged in the Tax Court proceedings. Id. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that the Elliots suffered "some damage" 
when they retained new tax counsel to represent them after receiving notice that their claimed 
deductions had been disallowed. Id. Specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court reasoned, "the Elliots 
sustained 'some damage' in the form of attorney's fees- a monetary loss they would not have 
suffered but for Parsons' alleged malpractice- when they hired tax lawyers in 1986 after receiving 
the 30-Day letter from the I.R.S." Id. 
Just like the Plaintiffs in Elliot v. Parsons case, the Minnicks claim they were relying upon 
Respondents to provide them with tax advice and Respondents did not provide it. This alleged 
negligence did not give rise to damages until the I.R.S. issued its 30-day notice of disallowance and 
the Minnicks hired new counsel to help them with their dealings with the I.R.S. At that point, their 
cause of action accrued because, even if the Minnicks had somehow succeeded in convincing the 
I.R.S. that the deduction should be allowed, the costs of defending that action would constitute 
damages to be recovered from the Respondents in this action. If the Respondents had performed the 
services the Minnicks contend they expected and had reviewed the conservation easement to ensure 
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that it complied with applicable law, then the Minnicks would not have to address any of the Tax 
Court issues; the conservation easement would meet all of the applicable requirements. 
Furthermore, the Tax Court proceedings will have no impact whatsoever on the Minnicks' 
claim that the Respondents' conduct was negligent. The Milmicks claim that the Respondents 
should have provided them with tax advice and, because they did not, the income tax deductions 
were disallowed and the Minnicks had to retain counsel. The Respondents admit that they did not 
provide the Minnicks with any tax advice. Thus, even if the Minnicks succeed with their Tax Court 
appeal, they can still argue that the Respondents' conduct - the failure to provide tax advice - was 
negligent. 
While the Milmicks may hold out hope that the Tax Court's decision will be reversed, this 
possibility does "not delay commencing the statute of limitations." See Reynolds v. Trout Jones 
Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idaho 21, 25, 293 P.3d 645, 649 (2013). "The mere hope that the loss 
may be recovered .. .in the future does not toll the statute oflimitations for malpractice." Id. (citing 
Lapham v. Stewart, 137 Idaho at 582,584,51 P.3d at 396,398). 
2. The Minnicks' Attempt to Limit their Claims is Inconsistent with the 
Allegations and Testimony in the Record and Represents an Effort to Apply a 
Discover Rule to These Proceedings. 
The Minnicks do not dispute that they hired tax counsel on June 1,2009 and began incurring 
attorneys fees at that time. However, they dispute whether hiring tax counsel can be correctly 
associated with the alleged negligence when they did not know, at the time, that the mortgage on the 
property had not been subordinated to the conservation easement. 
In contrast to their allegations in the Complaint, the Minnicks on summary judgment argue 
that the Respondents' malpractice was the failure to subordinate the mOligage. They contend that 
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they did not incur any attorneys fees specifically associated with the mortgage subordination issue 
until June 10,2010. Respondents further allege that this issue was the sole basis forthe Tax Court's 
adverse decision on December 17, 2012. 
There are three central problems with the Minnicks' argument discussed more fully below: 
first, there is no discovery rule in Idaho; second, their arguments on summary judgment are 
inconsistent with their allegations in the complaint and Mr. Milmick's sworn testimony; and third, 
the Minnicks were on notice of the alleged negligence by July 8, 2009 at the latest. 
a. There is No Discovery Rule in Idaho. 
The Respondents' argument is a thinly-veiled attempt to breathe a discovery rule into this 
discussion. This is reflected in their Complaint, which states, "On June 14,2011, the IRS requested 
from the Minnicks documents showing how the conservation easement satisfied the requirements 
of 26 CFR, Section 1 1. 170A-14(g)(2)" and "[a]s a consequence ofthis inquiry, it became apparent 
and the Plaintiffs first discovered that the Defendants had failed to take actions necessary to satisfy 
the subordination requirement. ... " Complaint and Demand/or Jury Trial, ~~ 43-44 (emphasis 
added). (R. pp. 000016-1 7). 
Under Idaho law, the date a claimant discovers the harm that has occurred is of no 
consequence to the question of when a cause of action accrues, because there is no discovery rule. 
The fact the loan had not been subordinated was objectively ascertainable at any time after the 
easement was recorded. The issue is when this latent negligence caused harm, not when the 
negligence or the harm was discovered. As previously discussed, the Minnicks first suffered "harm" 
attributable to the claimed negligence when they incurred attorneys' fees associated with defending 
the deduction. 
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b. The District Court Properly Rejected the Minnicks' Argument that the 
Negligence Alleged was Limited to the Defendants' Failure to 
Subordinate the Mortgage. 
To survive the statute oflimitations challenge, the Minnicks have tried to narrow the scope 
of the negligence alleged. However, their current characterizations ofthe claim are inconsistent with 
the record, including the Complaint and Mr. Milmick's previous sworn statements on the matter. 
For example, in the Complaint, the Milmicks assert that Respondents knew or should have 
known the Minnicks would need tax advice related to the conservation easement. Complaint and 
Demandfor Jury Trial, ~~ 19,20,54,55. (R. pp. 00009-10, 000015-16). Paragraph 56 in particular 
states: 
Defendants negligently failed to analyze, understand, appreciate, 
address, and resolve the tax implication ofthe charitable conservation 
easement gift to the Land Trust and the legal requirements for 
qualifYing for a charitable deduction to the Plaintiffs from the grant 
of such easement, including but not limited to satisfYing the 
requirements of 26 CFR, Section 1.170A-14(g)(2) and 26 CFR, 
Section 1.1 70A -14(g)( 6). 
Id. (R. 000015-16). 
In addition, Mr. Minnick submitted sworn testimony to the United States Court regarding the 
role of Respondents. This includes the following three statements. First: 
I engaged the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley ("Hawley 
Troxell") to provide legal advice and services on all aspects of the 
real estate development project that came to be known as the 
Showy Phlox Subdivision. 
CR. p. 000498). Second: 
The attorneys at Hawley Troxell knew and appreciated, or should 
have, that we were relying and depending on their law firm to address 
all legal issues and concerns related to the project, including 
providing necessary advice to us and handling all documentation 
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required to effect the conservation easement as a charitable 
deduction. 
(R. p. 000500) (emphasis added). Third: 
ld. 
My wife and I had no prior experience with conservation easements 
as a charitable gift, and we had no knowledge of the legal 
requirements for charitable tax deductions from such easements. Just 
as is customary in any other attorney-client relationship, we relied 
entirely upon attorneys at Hawley Troxell to provide us whatever 
advice and assistance was needed to comply with the applicable legal 
requirements. 
These statements are inconsistent with the Minnicks' current argument. If the Minnicks 
relied upon the Respondents for everything associated with obtaining a tax deduction for the 
easement, then any problems associated with that conservation easement would be fairly attributable 
to the Respondents. 
Nevertheless, in their Opening Brief on appeal, the Minnicks argue that they "retained tax 
counsel initially to address a number of issues the IRS raised as reasons for disqualifying a charitable 
deduction, none of which implicated a potential claim against Respondents." Appellants' 
Opening Brief, p. 17 (emphasis added). The Minnicks argue as follows: 
[T]he reasons for disallowance articulated by the IRS which caused 
Appellants to retain tax counsel were very particular. In its 30-Day 
letter ... the IRS alleged that the charitable deduction failed 
(1) because it was a quid pro quo transaction with the Land Trust, 
(2) because it was not 'exclusively for conservation purposes,' 
(3) because there needed to be a written acknowledgment from the 
Land Trust that no goods or services were provided in consideration 
for the gift, and (4) because the IRS contested the value of the 
donation. 
Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 17-18. Inexplicably, the Minnicks conclude: (1) "[a]ll of these 
allegations involved issues unrelated to Respondents' legal services"; (2) "[ n ]one give rise to a claim 
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of malpractice against Respondents," and (3) "none were ever alleged as the basis of Appellants' 
suit." Id. at p. 18. 
These conclusions cannot withstand reasoned scrutiny. First, assuming the Minnicks relied 
upon Respondents as described in Mr. Minnick's sworn statements to the Tax Court, then each and 
every one of these deficiencies reflects an error on the part of the Respondents. For example, if this 
development had been properly structured around an easement, then the easement itself would not 
have been a condition of plat approval. The fact the conservation easement was developed within 
the context of the plat approval process is fatal to any claim that it is a gift. 
Second, the phrase, "exclusively for conservation purposes" is a legal requirement from 26 
u.S.C. §§ 170(h)(1), 170(h)(4), and 170(h)(5) and, thus, relates directly to the perpetuity 
requirements outlined in 26 CFR 1.170A-14(h), including both the proceeds and subordination 
requirements. These requirements are expressly identified in the Minnicks' Complaint as bases for 
the Minnicks' claims against the Respondents. Complaint and Demandfor Jury Trial, ~~ 31-34, 43, 
56. (R. pp. 000012, 13, 15-16). 
The Minnicks argue that "it is beyond comprehension how the trial court could believe [this] 
implicated Respondents' legal services." Appellants J Opening Brief, p. 20. However, the Minnicks 
incorrectly assume that this requirement is limited to 26 U.s.C. § 170(h)(4) and is exclusively 
concerned "with an interpretation of whether it preserves land in perpetuity for public recreation, 
education, or scenic enjoyment, protects fish, wildlife or plat habitat or is historically important." 
Id. The Minnicks completely ignore the fact this requirement includes the perpetuity requirements 
of26 U.s.C. § 170(h)(5) and, thus, the very grounds for malpractice alleged in the Complaint. 
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Third, the only reason the Tax Court's decision focused exclusively on the mortgage 
subordination issue is because that is what the parties in the Tax Court proceedings requested the 
Tax Court to do and the issue was dispositive of the entire dispute. (R. 000465, 000628-29). 
Accordingly, it was not necessary for the Tax Court to address each and everyone of the deficiencies 
associated with the Minnicks' conservation easement. However, ifthe Minnicks had been able to 
convince the Tax Court that the loan subordination issue was not dispositive of the parties' dispute, 
the Tax Court would have had a number of other issues to address, all related to the fact the 
Minnicks did not receive any tax advice associated with the conservation easement. 
c. The Minnicks Should Have Known by July 8, 2009 that the Respondents 
Did Not Review the Easement for Tax Purposes and Did Not Otherwise 
Provide Them with Tax Advice. 
The Minnicks were on notice of the alleged malpractice as of July 8, 2009 when they 
received their notice of disallowance. At that point, they had already suffered some harm in the form 
of attorneys fees and they were notified that the conservation easement failed to meet the applicable 
regulations, including the mortgage subordination requirement. 
On July 8, 2009, the Minnicks received notice that their charitable donation deductions were 
disallowed for failure to meet the requirement that it was made "exclusively for conservation 
purposes." (R. pp. 354, 365). The Examiner Reports specifically identify that the conservation 
easement does not comply with both 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(1) and 170(h)(5). (R. pp. 355-56, 366-67). 
This is the perpetuity requirement and necessarily incorporates the loan subordination and proceeds 
requirements from the regulations, 26 C.F.R. § 1 70A -14(g). Therefore, even assuming arguendo that 
the mortgage subordination is the sole basis for the Minnicks' claim, they knew, or should have 
known, about it when they received the 30-day notices on July 8, 2009. 
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In conclusion, the trial court properly determined that the Minnicks' claim for negligence 
accrued on or before June 1,2009 when they hired tax counsel. Alternatively, the cause of action 
accrued at the latest on July 8, 2009 when the Minnicks received their 30-day letters and were placed 
on notice that the conservation contribution did not satisfy the perpetuity requirement of26 U.s.e. 
§ 170(h)(5) and 26 CFR § 1.170A-14(g). 
D. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED TO AWARD THE RESPONDENTS' 
ATTORNEYS FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 
§ 12-120(3). 
The district court properly determined that the basis of the legal malpractice claim is a 
commercial transaction. Therefore, under existing Idaho Supreme Court precedent, the Respondents 
are entitled to their attorneys fees as the prevailing party. 
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides for an award of attorneys fees to the prevailing party 
in "any civil action to recover . . . in any commercial transaction." The term "commercial 
transaction" is defined in the statute to include "all transactions except transactions for personal or 
household purposes." I.e. § 12-120(3). 
It is undisputed that the Respondents were the prevailing party before the district court. 
Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 23. The Minnicks dispute whether the parties' relationship may be 
fairly characterized as "fundamentally related to a commercial transaction." 
The Idaho Supreme COUli precedent is clear: attorneys fees are recoverable in attorney 
malpractice cases so long as the claims are fundamentally related to a commercial transaction. See 
Reynolds v. Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A., 154 Idaho at 26-27; Soignierv. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 
322,326,256 P.3d 730 (2011). 
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Idaho Code § 12-120(3) applies where a 'commercial transaction is 
integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party 
is attempting to recover,' and 'thus, as long as a commercial 
transaction is at the center of the lawsuit, the prevailing pm1y may be 
entitled to attorneys' fees for claims that are fundamentally related to 
the commercial transaction yet sound in t011.' 
Reynolds, 154 Idaho at 26-27 (citations omitted). 
In the Reynolds case the plaintiff had retained the defendant law firm "for the purpose of 
facilitating the purchase of real property for commercial purposes" and the defendant law firm 
"entered into the relationship for commercial, not altruistic purposes." Id. at 27. Accordingly, the 
Court held: 
Therefore, this transaction had 'the symmetry of commercial purpose 
necessary to trigger I.C. § 12-120(3). The malpractice claim was 
'fundamentally related' to this commercial transaction. 
Consequently, as the prevailing party in an action arising from a 
commercial transaction, [the defendant law firm] is entitled to 
attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. 
Reynolds, 154 Idaho at 27 (citations omitted). 
Likewise, Plaintiffs' claims here m-e fundamentally related to a commercial transaction. 
Plaintiff, Walter Minnick, hired the Defendant law firm to represent him for the purpose of 
subdividing and developing the property now known as the Showy Phlox Estates. Mr. Minnick 
planned to develop this property for commercial purposes (i.e. for sale to third parties). The 
conservation easement was drafted and recorded within the context of this commercial transaction. 
Further, the Respondents entered the relationship for commercial purposes and were paid for the 
time they spent on the project. See Reynolds, 154 Idaho at 27,293 P.3d at 651. 
Accordingly, the trmlsaction at issue has the symmetry of commercial purpose necessary to 
trigger Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). The malpractice claim was "fundamentally related" to the 
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underlying commercial transaction; the commercial transaction is integral to the claim; and the 
commercial transaction occurred between the prevailing party (Respondents) and the Minnicks. 
Thus, Respondents, as the prevailing party, are entitled to their reasonable attorneys' fees. 
The Minnicks argue that there is no "particular transaction of a commercial nature which was 
integral to and the basis of [the Minnicks'] malpractice claim." Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 27. 
The Minnicks further argue, "This is not a suit like Reynolds, emanating from the drafting and 
enforcement of a real estate purchase agreement." Id. 
These arguments strain reason and are inconsistent with the Minnicks allegations in the 
Complaint. First, the Minniks themselves sought attorneys fees under Section 12-120(3). Complaint 
and Demand/or Jury Trial, ~~ 52,60. Specifically, the Minnicks allege: 
There existed an attorney-client relationship between Plaintiffs and 
Defendants, contractual and commercial in nature, giving rise to legal 
duties and obligations owed by Defendant to Plaintiffs, and each of 
them, both in contract and in tort. 
Id. at ~ 52 (emphasis added). (R. pp. 000016-17). 
Second, in the Complaint, the Minnicks describe the complex real estate transaction 
necessary to subdivide the property for sale. ~ 15-17, 28. (R. p. 00008-9,28). It cannot reasonably 
be disputed that the subdivision process was for a commercial purpose. Mr. Minnick subdivided the 
property in order to develop and sell it. It was not a transaction for household purposes. This is true 
whether the Minnicks relied entirely upon the services of the Respondents or whether they hired the 
Respondents from time to time on project specific tasks. The impetus behind the subdivision 
process was commercial in nature. The commercial benefit the Minnicks received was the ability 
to sell lots in the Showy Phlox subdivision. 
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E. RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL 
Assuming the Respondents are the prevailing parties in this appeal, they request their 
attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) for the same reasons outline above. The 
nature of the parties' underlying transaction was a commercial real estate development project. 
Accordingly, the attorneys fees associated with litigating this legal malpractice claim, whether at the 
district or appellate court level, are appropriately deemed commercial in nature. Therefore, as the 
prevailing party, the Respondents are entitled to their attorneys fees for the fees and costs associated 
with defending against this appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The district court's decisions on the Respondents' motion for summary judgment and 
subsequent request for costs and fees were well-reasoned, grounded in fact and existing law. 
Accordingly, the Respondents respectfully request the Court affirm these decisions and award 
Respondents their attorneys fees for the time spent on this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this )30 day of May, 2014. 
HEPWORTH, JANIS & KLUKSDAL 
IS 
S for Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofIdaho, with offices at 537 W. Bannock 
S1., Ste. 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idah0Je.701-2582, and one of the attorneys for the Defendants 
in this matter, certifies that on this '23 day of May, 2014, he caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
William L. Mauk 
Mauk Miller & Burgoyne, LLC 
515 South Sixth Street 
P.O. Box 1743 
Boise,ID 83701-1743 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[XJ Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile Transmission 
[ ] E-mail Transmission 
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